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Athens is not built by large scale masterplans 1. Large public or 
private housing projects are nowhere to be found. Even an empirical 
observation of the city makes one thing immediately apparent: the 
city is defined by a construction model that is actualised by a singular 
building unit. These buildings, “on average four to five storeys high, are 
organized in irregular, fragmented plots in a patchwork of discontinuous 
grids, made of in situ, labour-intensive concrete frames, filled with bricks, 
plastered, something that ultimately looks like a stack of slabs with 
rather continuous balconies” (Issaias, 2017, p. 223). 
This essay develops a critical reading of this model, presenting 
the way this domestic environment and distinct architectural typology 
mediated social conflict and economic development in post-war 
Greece. Architecture and urban management are presented here 
relating production with the role and the function of family and 
inheritance, the real estate market, law, and the construction industry.
How is it possible to introduce a particular archaeology, an attempt 
to trace the situation Greece is currently into in a series of decisions 
and projects that had to do with space and urban development? 
Ultimately, how can we re-position the pure macro-economic reasoning 
of the crisis, how can we move beyond all the issues that have to do 
with public debt, state insolvency, institutional functions, corruption, 
etcetera and to think if there is a link between this kind of urbanity, the 
way it has been produced spatially, economically and socially and the 
problems that emerged and framed the ongoing economic crisis?
The following is an attempt to break a social consensus that 
effectively suspended any attempt to relate space, architecture, city 
making, the function of the family and the modes of existence defined 
by and through this built environment with the economic problems in 
this later phase.
Why the Troika cares about flats in Athens?
From the 1950s until the mid-2000s, construction in Greece stood 
for an average 10% of GDP, 50% of which located in the secondary 
sector and, until 2007, investments in housing consisted of 75% of 
total investment in construction. From 1997 until 2007, the year that 
the global economic crisis commenced, housing prices in Greece had 
increased by 175%. From 2007 until 2011, the combined decline of 
investments in construction of housing units reached 65%. From 2007 
and until the first quarter of 2014, the combined decline of capital 
investment in the Greek economy was €42,5bn, from which, 61%, or 
€26bn, were lost in the construction industry. This translates to about 
250.000 jobs losses in the sector and an average decline of housing 
prices of around 35%. From 2007 until the end of 2016, the combined 
decline of construction activity reached 165% 2.
It’s obvious that the above figures described a dramatic situation 









important sectors of the Greek economy, organized in small scale, 
fragmented teams of builders and local developers, collapsed during 
the past ten years of the economic crisis.
On July 13, 2015 and after 17 hours of negotiations, the SYRIZA-
led government agreed to sign a third memorandum, a new €86bn 
bailout plan. This was a humiliating development that followed months 
of intense negotiations, political and media drama, and of course the 
referendum on July 4, 2015. This third memorandum required very 
similar things to the previous two: a new wave of extensive pension 
cuts, tax increases, and the mandatory privatization of multiple public 
companies and assets. However, the agreement requested a few other 
things, extremely crucial for architecture, housing development and 
city planning. Firstly, the lift of legal provisions that protected primary 
residence in Greece, i.e. the introduction of income criteria in relation to 
the value of assets. Secondly, the introduction of a new law that would 
allow for immediate foreclosures. And thirdly, to maintain the property 
tax that was introduced as part of the previous memoranda. These 
three requests, de facto cancelled one of SYRIZA’s most important and 
anticipated reforms on housing and the real estate market. One could 
even argue that SYRIZA actually won the elections of January 2015 
running on a platform that had to do with these three issues, mainly the 
cancellation of the universal property tax that was introduced in 2010.
The bailout agreement that included the above was almost 
impossible to pass from the Greek parliament. After new national 
elections in September 2015, the package was finally passed two 
years ago in mid-November 2015, following brutal and almost 
totally unsuccessful last-minute efforts to adjust some of the Troika’s 
requirements.
The dispute between the Greek government and the European 
institutions, but also the dispute that formalized certain political 
conflicts within the Greek society was about two laws that define a 
series of algorithmic calculations with profound effects on the real 
estate market, individuals and families.
The first legal protocol, the 3869/10 law of the Greek state called 
for the regulation of over-indebted natural persons; legal entities and 
private companies were excluded from the provisions of this framework. 
The law covered and protected individuals that could not pay back 
any type of housing loan or mortgage, credit card, or any other type of 
bank loan. The key thing is that this arrangement was meant to happen 
without defaulting of one’s private debt, and all the consequences this 
has for one’s credit history. Individuals could declare their inability to 
pay back the bank, or the state and, after a not so lengthy and straight-
forward procedure they could arrange either a beneficial arrangement, 
or the overall write off of their private debt. These provisions were 
particularly important for primary residencies, i.e. for the house that 
someone or a family lives in. In Greece, like in most countries, primary 
residence is a subject of various benefits, reduced taxation and the like.
The provisions of the 3869/10 law meant that foreclosures were 
literally impossible in Greece. To give a sense of the scale, almost 
half million people are exposed to mortgages in Greece and the non-
serviced housing loans last year represented an overall capital of more 
than €28bn, of which €12bn refer to primary residence 3.
The 3869/10 law was a desperate act from the socialist party 
government to counter-balance the devastated effects of the May 
2010 first bailout package and the Troika was against it since the very 
beginning. On July 2015, and with its majority votes on November 
2015, the SYRIZA-led government agreed to suspend most of these 
provisions, especially the ones related to housing and housing 
mortgages. They came up with a set of new numbers, the 4346/15 law, 
a more refined, yet brutal algorithmic calculus. This new legal protocol 
makes things slightly more complicated. This new form of calculation 
was put in place precisely to counter-balance or to define what kind of 
property is “big” enough, i.e. what kind of property in terms of capital 
represents a kind of asset that belongs to a wealthy individual, or a 
wealthy household. Most importantly, the algorithm considers the 
current price of the estate in relation to a projected value, or more 
precisely, the prospect of an individual to pay back more than the 
current value of her / his own house. It calculates risk, in benefit of the 
bank. If the algorithm can prove it, you lose your house.
A properly sinister machine this. The law protects primary 
residence only circumstantially, again in relation to the value of the 
property, not the actual market value but the fair market value, one that 
the tax authorities calculate and adjust according to various parameters.
Numbers are important, or more precisely, the way figures are 
calculated. They are important because around them they organize 
a series of disputes. They bring into proximity, they spatialize and 
re-territorialize a financial problem, capital, a seemingly abstract 
algorithmic calculation to something very concrete: few walls that 
define someone’s flat and his or her own life and survival. Monetary 
value, financial value is not anymore something distant but is put into 
conflict with other forms of calculations: of use value, of life, of comfort, 
of social conduct and habits. These numbers and the way they are 
measured have the potential to organize conflict and set up a variety of 
struggles in an entirely different way.
The second issue was the Uniform Property Tax, or ENFIA in 
Greek. Greece had no property tax until 1997. There were moments 
of minimal taxation, for example, in relation to inheritance, or asset 
transfer, but Greece was characterized by a condition within which 
space was not contributing through taxation to the public books. 
The Greek state therefore didn’t gain directly any capital from the 
construction industry. We must add to the above that until 2005, the 
construction industry was extensively VAT exempt, or that individuals 
didn’t have to declare the source of capital to buy or build a primary 









It is still paid as a minimal percentage of electricity bills and goes 
directly to the central government and not to local municipalities.
In 1997, the socialist government introduced the 2459/97 law on 
Large Real Estate Property Tax, which very few individuals had to pay, 
in any case, with quite large properties. In 2008, there was an attempt 
to regularize and expand it, something that finally happened a year 
later. The limit at that time was set to 400.000 Euros, i.e. someone was 
asked to pay property tax if the combined value of his / her real estate 
was more than 400.000 Euros fair market value, calculated according 
to areas, location, age of the property etcetera. In 2010 and as part 
of the first memorandum, these limits went down until we reach an 
unprecedented decision. The property tax was generalized to every 
property and was included as an emergency measure to electricity bills. 
If you did not pay, the consequences were that the company was cutting 
your electricity.
In 2015, SYRIZA was elected insisting on a single promise: the 
uniform property tax will be cancelled, and if some form of property 
tax continues to exist this will only affect large real estate holders. 
This promise was de facto cancelled, and Greeks start receiving again 
the ENFIA spreadsheets, Asking them to pay according to a series 
of criteria. Again, a form of calculation is put at play: how big is the 
property, how many do you have, where, how much percentage, are you 
married or not, is it a shared property or not, is it land or built space, or 
both combined, do you have kids, are they over 18, are you retired, have 
you paid your taxes, if not, since when, do you owe any money to the 
state, to the bank, or anyone else.
Now, the dispute here, one that defined parliamentary politics in 
Greece since 1997, could be outlined with this very simple question: 
how big is large?
These new measures and conditions are already initiating a new 
property regime, one that is profoundly unfair. The events since the 
summer 2015 have been marking the end of a previous model that 
defined the urban horizon of Greece since the 1950s. Horizontal over-
taxation and the more than real potential of hundreds of thousands of 
loans payment defaults and foreclosures, in a process presented as a 
further “rationalization” of economic transactions related to real estate, 
housing in Greece is de-valorised such that large corporations and 
banks may acquire and accumulate it from the hands of the indebted, 
the class paradoxically made up of its original producers and owners. 
Space, the flat of the typical household enters the realm of financial 
calculation and the machines of the debt economy.
Prehistory
But, what was the model before?
This part will trace the evolution of aW system of building, the 
foundation of a housing market and an economy of construction, 
protocols of inheritance and inter-family relations that defined this 
urban environment. Melinda Cooper’s work is crucial here (Cooper, 
2017). Although her exceptional study refers to the ways neoliberalism 
instrumentalized family, familial relations and inheritance in real estate 
and a new political life in America since the 1970s, the “Greek case” 
seems to be an extreme example where very similar processes have 
been tested in a rather peripheral economy. A free-market model has 
been developed since the 1950s in Greece, within which space and 
small-scale land accumulation played a fundamental role in economic 
and urban development, to achieve social peace. This is the model 
that now turns against itself. I will trace the evolution and the different 
phases of this project, speculating on the relation between architecture, 
economic models and the politics of reconstruction, before concluding 
again with few more thoughts on the contemporary situation.
Let’s go back to the late 1920s. Athens experienced two extensive 
internal and external migration waves. The first, was stimulated by the 
rise of industrial and manufacturing centres in the city’s metropolitan 
area. The second, is the aftermath of the Greek-Turkish war of 1919 – 1922 
that brings into Greece about 1,5 million people as part of an agreed 
population exchange between the two countries (Fig. 1). In few months 
of 1922 and 1923, Athens received more than 250.000 people, de facto 
raising its population by one third. This early migration and incredible 
refugee crisis necessitated immediate humanitarian actions, especially 
tackling the problem of housing. At the same time, Athens attracted 
more white-collar workers too, mainly public servants, military, 
individuals in private / public companies (Issaias, 2014).
Fig. 1 Tent village in the shadows of the Temple 
of Theseus, Athens, where Greek refugees 
make their homes. Date 1922. (Unprocessed). 
Repository: Library of Congress Prints and 










This is when an experiment of social engineering started 
materializing. Working class and the pure segments of the refugee 
population were either left to live in self-built, unregulated 
settlements, with a permission to use and occupy a piece of land, 
acquiring titles rather quickly, or were given access to different types 
of housing, again getting the entire share of the property, both land 
and the house. They were not renting, they were not recipients of 
subsidies, they were owners of their own family home. Petit bourgeois 
and middle-class refugees and natives were spread in a network of 
garden-city like settlements around Athens. This happens either 
through the international humanitarian aid that assisted the refugee 
settlement committee, or through a planning protocol, the July 27, 
1923 about “Plans for Cities, Towns and Settlements of the State”, that 
allows for a group of individuals to acquire land and implement a 
plan outside the official limits of the city and its municipality. These 
suburbs introduced an extremely opportunistic and speculative 
treatment of land and property. It is precisely the mechanism that 
working-class cooperatives would use after the war and until at least 
the 1970s to regulate and legalize their settlements, formalizing and 
monetizing their real estate properties.
Two rings started to form by the late 1920s. Most importantly, a 
project was unfolding setting up the root of our problem. This pattern 
of urban development initiated and prescribed the foundation of a 
mode of production of residential space, very similar to the partially 
outlawed sub-market of the poor. We are talking here about a method 
of “self-building”, a mechanism with which, from this moment on, 
the Greek cities expanded. It fitted the form of landownership and 
the organization of labour within the building industry. Small groups 
of builders, local-scale developers, and a large petit bourgeois class 
of technicians, engineers and architects are the ones that actually 
built the modern Greek city, “piece by piece and section by section” 
(Philippides, 1999, p. 67).
However, there is an additional consequence of this “informal” 
method of urban growth. In all the different variations that 
appeared, from the refugee settlements, to the working-class satellite 
neighborhoods, to the high-bourgeois “private suburbs”, this mode 
of production of residential space institutionalized private property 
in the Greek social context. From the two-storey, family-owned types 
for the refugees, to the poorly built shacks for the proletarians, to the 
large villas for the high bourgeoisie, the different housing units were 
private assets of the inhabitants, which possessed both the land and the 
building on top of it. The particularities of each case, like the different 
ways each land piece or housing type had been acquired or assembled, 
did not contradict the essence of the strategy, which directed 
simultaneously all social classes to the realm of private property.
Two other problems emerged: How is it possible to densify the city 
centre of Athens? The second issue had to do with the 1929 economic 
crisis (Sarigiannis, 2000). How is it possible to allow for and to direct 
investment in real estate of capital that was accumulated by high 
bourgeois subjects, mainly Greek speaking refugees from Turkey and 
merchants from the Greek diaspora, de facto offering a kind of safer 
possibility to deposit money outside of stock markets and protecting it 
from violent fluctuations of international trade?
The answer was sketched by two regulatory protocols. The first 
building regulation in the country introduced the radical modification 
of the allowed building heights and numerous provisions that dealt with 
the three-dimensional, permissible object, mainly the ways adjacent 
structures approach or make contact, which is a key element of how 
you relate an architectural object with land property divisions and 
forms of building development. Additionally, it included many hygienic 
and organizational requirements, such as minimum openings, size and 
location of light wells, design directives and minimums for entrances, 
staircases and the like (Sakelaropoulos, 2003).
If the General Building Regulation allowed for a new architectural 
form to emerge, the second legal text, the law on property divisions, 
provided the framework that radically modified the private ownership 
status in Greece, achieving the “transition from the institution of freehold 
ownership to the one of horizontal and vertical property” (Marmaras, 
1991, p. 10). In this new system, a group of individuals co-owns a single 
property in predefined percentages. Gradually, the residential buildings 
in Greece were not anymore singular, undivided estates, but complex, 
highly fragmented equities, with multiple owners per property. The 
formation of this new property regime allowed a new domestic 
architectural type to emerge, one that acquired the central role in the 
introduction of a particular form of residential space and property 
i.e. the rented apartment. Interestingly, an individual’s percentage 
corresponds to an actual property that has literally no thickness 
since it consists of the interior surfaces of a flat. Everything else, from 
architectural elements to building materials are subject of collective 
ownership that cannot be located. This mean that an individual owes X 
amount of cement, of a staircase, of the building’s foundations.
From 1929 until 1941, 450 buildings of that kind were built within 
the limits of the municipality of Athens, an area smaller than 12 square 
kilometres (Marmaras, 1991, p. 126). If in the interwar period, these 
two texts opened the possibility for high-rise, luxurious, modern 
apartment buildings to appear and to eventually present an alternative 
architectural and urban model for mass housing in Greece, it would be 
in the aftermath of the Second World War where the full potential of 
this typology would be exploited.
The second World War didn’t end in 1945 in Greece. Following 
the liberation from the Nazis in October 1944, the country entered a 
devastating Civil War that lasted in phases of various intention until 
October 1949 (Fig. 2) 4. From official documents and reports written by 









Fig. 2 A paratrooper from 5th (Scots) Parachute 
Battalion, 2nd Parachute Brigade, takes cover 
on a street corner in Athens during operations 
against members of ELAS, 18 December 1944. 
NA 20863. War Office Second World War 
Official Collection (photographs). Made by:  
No. 2 Army Film & Photographic Unit.  
© IWM (NA 20863)
local experts and bourgeois politicians it is evident that a particular 
project was being formulated. The purpose of this plan was to transform 
and to present the country as an exemplary operation. Differently 
to other European countries, the decision was to promote a postwar 
reconstruction strategy without the direct interference of the state, i.e. 
without a public welfare agenda, based on the capabilities and interests 
of the private sector. Foreign large-scale capital, in the form of aid 
programs and transnational loans, would take over major productive 
sectors, infrastructure and natural resources. The main strategy, not just 
for Athens but every city in Greece, was the guidance of the population’s 
economic activities to the small-scale building industry, which would 
eventually allow the working class and the poor to enter the realm 
of private property. The development of a mass, petit-bourgeois 
consumerism accompanied this condition, where the possession of 
a single-family house or of an apartment in a newly built apartment 
building, was presented as the ultimate social achievement (Fig. 3).
And this is what happened. In 2006, Greece had an 84,6% 
homeownership rate, (Rousanoglou, 2006), second only to Spain 
in the entire EU. From the group of homeowners, 74% had assets 
of a combined value of up to 100.000 Euros, consisting to a large 
extent, of percentages of property assets, i.e. products of inheritance 
(Hatzinikolaou, 2014). Greek governments modify building regulations 
in crucial social and economic moments, (Woditsch, 2009) gradually 
transforming the high bourgeois apartment building of central Athens 
to a generic frame, adaptable to different environments of different 
densities and areas in the city, eventually becoming a quasi-“classless” 
residential unit.
Apart from regulations, the main tool was the interpretation and the 
consecutive application of provisions described in the 1929 property 
law that hasn’t changed. This process is called “antiparochi”, a form of 
barter exchange applied to the construction industry. It consists of a 
form of economic agreement between landlords and contractors. This 
mechanism merged the self-building mode of production of residential 
space with the speculative housing market (Fig. 4).
It provided the framework where, a respective land piece, owned 
by a family, or a single person, was exchanged, without any further 
tax, with built space, in most cases, a number of apartments. It was a 
private agreement between a local contractor and a property owner to 
trade the plot with a percentage of the built surface in a new building. 
The landowners had the opportunity to increase their income, by 
renting the apartments that they did not use as their own house, and 
the contractors to obtain land without bank loans. Poorer people were 
either buying or renting the remaining surfaces from the contractors.
Figure 5 is a preliminary contract between a member of my family 
and a contractor. The flat was never acquired. What we see here is 
astonishing (Figs. 5a, 5b). On the left, a detailed description of the flat, 
its materials, the number of plugs, the doors, if and which ones will have 











Fig. 4 Apartment building in 129 Vas. Sophias 
Ave., 1957. Nikos Valsamakis personal archive.









1 ≥ The article is based on the lectures delivered at “Existential Territories”, 
a two-day symposium organized by the School of Architecture, Royal College of 
Art, 17 – 18 / 11 / 2017 and the City-Architecture PhD programme at the Architectural 
Association, 26 / 10 / 2016.
For more on Athens and this article’s particular methodology can be found among 
others in: Issaias, P. (2014). Beyond the Informal City: Athens and the 
Possibility of an Urban Common. TU Delft, PhD Thesis.
2 ≥ The above data are collected from the annual reports of the Hellenic 
Statistical Authority (ELSTAT) and the annual reports of the Bank of Greece. 
Reports available online.
a key or not, the handrails, the kitchen, the tiles, the infrastructure of 
the toilet; it refers to the above as “European”, which meant that they 
would be luxurious for 1950s Greece. On the right, you see the drawings 
included in the contract. A section and a plan. This is how and what built 
Athens and any other city in Greece until the recent economic crisis.
Conclusions — What Now?
The model of post-war reconstruction in Greece managed to privatize 
and to fragment cities and buildings to an extreme level. This is 
embedded in its very genetic code, a mechanism to divide, split, 
calculate percentages in relation to capital value. The fact that is 
conceived as an algebraic machine and not an algorithmic one, as in 
this later, post-memoranda reality, doesn’t make it less dangerous. It is 
precisely what made it that powerful, its apparent innocence rendered 
in badly made sketches of non-existing buildings next to surreal 
descriptions of location of plugs and marble finishing fillets.
As we have argued elsewhere, the seeming “informality”, which 
of course is based on the Maison Dom-ino model — applied in the 
most successful way to Greece and the polykatoikia system — is the 
paradigmatic scheme through which the organization of work of the 
assembly line merged with the organization of production of space and 
the particularities of the modern construction industry (Aureli, Giudici, 
Issaias, 2012). What we witness is a project that formalized the economy 
of construction and pushed Greeks to become asset managers, working 
and middle-class families being converted to real estate speculators.
What do we do now?
I don’t think there are easy answers to that.
A hardcore adjustment project is already unfolding: in the last 
couple of weeks, online auctions organized by banks have devastated 
large number of households. How can an alternative project be 
conceived? In my point of view, what has to be confronted is the core 
of this project, which the role of family and inheritance, and property 
itself. Only then we could develop alternative models of ownership, re-
calculating value and cost not only the way capital does. This is not only 
an economic problem. It is profoundly a political and a moral one that 
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